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By GEORGE W. PAToN*
A FTER an interesting and skillful examination of the cases, Pro-
fessor Prosser1 argues that the American Law Institute's
Restatement of the Law of Torts is wrong in so far as it empha-
sizes the test of material interest in the definition of the term
"business visitor."2 His thesis is that, in the early cases dealing
with the liability of an occupier, business interest or pecuniary
gain is only incidentally mentioned; that the decisions which have
turned on the presence or absence of business interest are few
in comparison with the large number which cannot be accounted
for on that basis.
So far as American law is concerned, the writer has no com-
ments-it would be presumption for a stranger to challenge an
expert. But if Professor Prosser's thesis is correct for American
law, then there is a gulf between it and modern English law on
this point.
A. THE CASES RELATING TO INVITEES
A historical survey of the English cases brings out strongly
that business interest is the test which has been applied ever
since Indermaur v. Dames.3 Before that, the cases are very con-
fused and, as late as 1864, Pigot, L. C. B., confessed the difficulty
of discovering any rule at all. 4 But in 1866, Willes, J., stated the
test which since has been followed almost universally in England:
invitees are those who "go upon business which concern the
occupier, and upon his invitation, express or implied."5 This test
had been foreshadowed by Erle, J., in Chapman v. Rothwell6 a
few years before, when he distinguished between the case of a
visitor who must take care of herself and a customer who, as one
of the public, is invited for the purpose of business carried on by
the defendant.
*Professor of Jurisprudence, University of Melbourne.
'Prosser, Business Visitors and Invitees, (1942) 26 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 573.2Restatement of Torts (1934), sec. 332.
;(1866) L. R. I C. P. 274, Har. & Ruth. 243, 35 L. J. C. P. 184, 14
L. T. 484.
4Sullivan v. Waters, (1864) 14 I. C. L. R. 460.5Indermaur v. Dames, (1866) L. R. 1 C. P. 274, Har. & Ruth. 243,
35 L.J. C. P. 184, 14 L. T. 484.C(1858) E. B. & E. 168, 27 L. J. Q. B. 315, 4 Jur. N. S. 1180.
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In Holmes v. North Eastern Ry. Co.,7 there are signs of hesi-
tation as to the exact rule. Bramwell, B., certainly speaks of an
invitation "in the same sense in which the public are invited to
go into a shop." But Channel, B., emphasises the modern rule:
"In the delivery and receipt of the coal there was a common
interest in them and in the plaintiff ... and this prevents the case
from being that of one who is a mere licensee." Cleasley, B.,
remarks: "The question of a mere licensee does not arise: for
as soon as you introduce the element of business ... all idea of
mere voluntariness vanishes." Denman, J., lays down the same
test in White v. France,8 although he goes fairly far in applying
it to the facts. Plaintiff, who was a waterman, went to defendant
to complain about the navigation of one of the latter's barges. The
learned judge found that he was there on lawful business, in
which both parties had an interest.
Miller v. Hancock9 raises an interesting point, and we will
depart from the chronological order, so as to discuss its subsequent
history. The Court of Appeal held that an invitee of a tenant was
also an invitee of the landlord in using the common staircase,
following Smith v. London and St. Katharine Docks Co.10 In that
case, defendant dock company, because of an arrangement with
the owner of the ship, was responsible for providing a gangvay
to it. Plaintiff was an invitee of one of the officers of the ship
and was injured owing to the negligent placing of the gangway.
There was clearly no direct bond of interest between defendants
and the plaintiff, for it was the shipowner who paid for the dock-
ing charges. Bovill, C. J., however, considered that the defendants
were paid to provide a gangway for all persons having business
with the ship, and therefore that plaintiff was "invited." Even
apart from this view, there was ample cause to find for the plain-
tiff, since the gangway, placed as it was, constituted a trap of
which defendants knew and of which plaintiff was ignorant. This
case has never been specifically over-ruled, although it was ex-
plained by the House of Lords in Fairnian's Case"' as depending
on the fact that there was a trap known to defendants. In the
same case, however, the Lords over-ruled Miller v. Hancock.-2
7(1869) L. R. 4 Ex. 254, 38 L. J. Ex. 161, 20 L. T. 616.8(1877) 2 C. P. D. 308, 46 L. J. Q. B. 283.
9[1893] 2 Q. B. 177, 69 L. T. 214, 9 T. L. R. 512.
10(1868) L. R. 3 C. P. 326, 37 L. 3. C. P. 217, 18 L. T. 403.
"Fairrnan v. Perpetual Investment Building Society, [1923] A. C. 74,
92 L. J. K. B. 50, 128 L. T. 386.
1"-[1893] 2 Q. B. 177, 69 L. T. 214, 9 T. L. R. 512.
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Lord Buckmaster defined an invitee as one "invited to the premises
by the owner or occupier for purposes of business or material
interest." The facts of Fairman's Case were that the plaintiff was
a lodger with one of the tenants and so it would have been possible
without great difficulty to have held that there was an interest be-
tween the landlord and the plaintiff, since, if tenants cannot take
lodgers, then the landlord may find it more difficult to let the flats.
But it -was held that the plaintiff was a licensee, and the only duty
owed by the defendants was not to expose her to a concealed
danger or trap of which defendants knew.
In Haseldine v. Daw & Son, Ltd.,13 Scott, L. J., had the
courage to suggest that the Lords were merely uttering obiter
dicta when they suggested that an invitee of a tenant is only a
licensee of the landlord; his argument was that on the facts the
plaintiff in Fairman's Case could not have recovered, even if she
had been an invitee, since the alleged danger was one that was
perfectly obvious. Goddard, L. J., however, refused to take this
view which rejected what had been the universal interpretation
of Fairman's Case for the last twenty years. Clauson, L. J., did
not specifically discuss this point, but, although the C~urt was
thus equally divided on this issue, there is little doubt that English
lawyers will continue to interpret Fairman's Case in the traditional
fashion.' 4 As in Haseldine's Case leave was given to appeal to the
House of Lords, the point may soon be cleared up.
To return to our chronological survey, in 1913 Hamilton, L. J.,
stated that the term invitee is reserved for those who are "invited
into the premises by the owner or occupier for some purpose of
business or of material interest."'' In 1916, it was laid down in
the Court of Appeal: "It is essential to the plaintiff's case that
he should bring himself into the position of an invitee, and he
can only do that by satisfying the Court that by reason of the
contract between the defendants and the County Council the
defendants had a common interest with his employers in the com-
pletion of the work and that therefore he, as a workman employed
on the work . . . was using the gangway as an invitee of the
defendants."'"
13[1941] 3 All E. R. 156.
14This is the view taken by Dixon, J., in Lipman v. Clendinnen, 46
C. L. R. 550.
V"Latham v. Johnson (R.) & Nephew, Ltd., [1913] 1 K. B. 398, 410,
82 L. J. K. B. 258, 108 L. T. 4.
'
0 Per Bankes, L. J., Elliott v. Roberts (C.P.) & Co., Ltd., [1916] 2
K. B. 518, 527, 85 L. J. K. B. 1689, 115 L. T. 255.
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In 1917, Scrutton, L. J., used the phrase licensee with an
interest. "A licensee who is on premises on the business of the
owner, or with a common interest with them, is not a bare or mere
licensee, but a licensee with an interest and has the same rights as
an invitee.'1 7 This case concerned an actress who had as yet no
contract, but was attending rehearsals in the hope of obtaining
one.
Mercer v. South Eastern and Chatham Ry. Co.'s Managing
Committee,18 is a curious case. Defendants normally locked the
pedestrian gate at a level crossing when a train was approaching.
On one occasion, the signalman forgot to do so and plaintiff began
to cross and was injured by a train. Lush, J., held that by leaving
the gate unlocked the plaintiff received a tacit invitation to cross
the line, and applied Indermaur v. Dames on the ground that
plaintiff was an invitee. This case really belongs, not to the law
concerning private occupiers and their visitors, but to that dealing
with public utilities and those who enter as of right. In no way
does the public utility invite pedestrians to use a public crossing-
there is no bond of material interest and the railway company has
no power to forbid use of the path, save when the crossing is
needed for railway traffic. The better view is that the duty of a
public utility is higher than that owed to invitees-it must make
the premises reasonably safe, whereas an occupier probably fulfils
his duty to an invitee by giving warning of known dangers. This,
however, is still a fairly open point in English law, but as it is
not directly relevant, we do not pursue it.
In Sutcliffe v. Clients Investment Co.,"9 the owners of a flat
leased it to a tenant and agreed to contribute to the cost of re-
pairing and decorating it at the commencement of the term. The
tenant actually engaged the builders. While on a balcony, which
was not part of the demised premises, the foreman fell, because
the balustrade collapsed, and was killed. His widow was held
entitled to recover against the landlord, the court emphasizing the
bond of common interest between the builder and the landlord;
the builder was "doing repairs in which both the tenant and the
landlord were interested." Lord Dunedin, in 1929, used the same
-
7Hayward v. Drury Lane Theatre & Moss' Empires, [1917] 2 K. B.
899, 914, 87 L. J. K. B. 18, 117 L. T. 523. In Pritchard v. Peto, [1917] 2
K. B. 173, 86 L. J. K. B. 1292, 117 L. T. 145, a tradesman, calling to collect
a bill, was held to be an invitee.
18[1922] 2 K. B. 549, 92 L. J. K. B. 25, 127 L. T. 723.
19[1924] 2 K. B. 746, 94 L. J. K. B. 113, 132 L. T. 83.
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test. "'The invitee must be on the land for some purpose in which
he and the proprietor have a joint interest. '2 °
In WVeigall v. Westninster Hospital2l the plaintiff was the
mother of a patient and was injured when she slipped on a highly
polished floor. The majority of the Court of Appeal emphasized
that, as the mother was paying both the hospital and the surgeon,
she was an invitee, not only when visiting her son in the hospital,
but also when she entered a small room in order to discuss the
case with the surgeon.
In Griffiths v. St. Clement's School2  an exhibition of school
work was organized by the managers of a school and the parent
of a pupil was injured when the floor collapsed. The parent was
treated as an invitee, the bond of material interest being found
in the fact that it was in the interest of the school to secure the
support and co-operation of the parents by showing to them the
work done at the school.
Professor Prosser suggests: "It is only when entry is upon
private premises for a private purpose that 'business dealings' be-
come decisive. When the English and Canadian Courts were at
last confronted squarely with the issue of a public invitation with-
out any possibility of economic benefit, in the case of a municipal
playground, a free public library, and even a railway crossing open
for public use, it is not surprising, in the light of Corby v. Hill,2 3
that the plaintiffs were held to be invitees."
It is submitted that this statement does not correctly portray
modern English law. The writer has discussed this problem else-
where in an article dealing with the general problem of the duty
owed to those who enter as of right.2 4 The Court of Appeal
treats children in public playgrounds as licensees, not as invitees,
precisely because there is no bond of material interest between the
child and the authority which supplies the playground. Two mem-
2
"Robert Addie & Son's Collieries, Ltd. v. Dumbreck, [1929] A. C. 358,
371, 98 L. J. P. C. 119, 140 L. T. 650.
2 1[1936] 1 All E. R. 232, 52 T. L. R. 301. Eve, J., dissented, holding
that the mother was only a licensee.
2-[1938] 3 All E. R. 537. Actually, Tucker, J., found for the defendants
on a point arising under the Public Authorities Protection Act. The case
was affirmed on appeal, but the argument in the court of appeal was con-
fined to the statutory defense. See Griffiths v. Managers of St. Clement's
School, [1939] 2 All E. R. 76.
23(1858) 4 C. B. N. S. 556, 27 L. J. C. P. 318, 31 L. T. 0. S. 181.
24Paton, The Responsibility of An Occupier to Those Who Enter as of
Right, (1941) 19 Can. B. R. 1.
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bers of the Court adopted this view in Ellis' Case,2  and in Coates'
Case, Slesser, L. J., said that it was not possible to go beyond
the majority decision in the former case.26 One cannot treat the
decision of the House of Lords in Glasgow Corp. v. Taylor2 7 as
laying down a definite rule on this point. The poisonous berries
constituted a trap of which defendants knew and hence the plain-
tiff child could recover even if he was only a licensee. Lord
Atkinson, Buckmaster, and Sumner merely followed the "trap
cases." Lord Shaw did say that, the child being there as of right,
he was entitled to rely on the gardens being in a reasonably safe
condition, but this dictum is rather an argument for treating those
who enter as of right as being outside the categories of licensees and
invitees altogether, than a plea that the child is an invitee. Had
the Lords laid down a definite rule that the child is an invitee, it
would have bound the Court of Appeal in 1938, whereas the court
(as shown above) held that the child was only a licensee.
The view of the High Court of Australia is shown by a case
decided in 1939.28 The facts were that defendants had the control
of a jetty which the public were entitled to use free of charge.
Plaintiff was injured because of a dangerous gap in the planking
-the defendants knowing of this danger. The plaintiff could
succeed therefore, even if he were only a licensee. Dixon, J.,
however, discussed the rules relating to those who enter as of
right. He found it impossible to describe these visitors as either
licensees (since they entered as of right and not by mere permis-
sion) or as invitees (since there was no bond of material interest).
Speaking of invitees, the learned Justice stated: "The governing
consideration is found in the character in which an invitee comes
upon the premises and in the interest of the occupier in giving
the invitation. Whether the invitation be express or implied,
general or particular, it arises from reasons of business or is
connected with some other actual or potential advantage to the
occupier. The object of the visit is incidental to matters in which
the occupier has a pecuniary or material interest." -2 9 In another
case, the same Justice said: "It is enough if the visitor comes upoh
26Ellis v. Fulham Borough Council, [1938] 1 K. B. 212, 107 L. J. K. B.
84, 157 L. T. 380. Purkis v. Walthamstow Borough Council, [1934] 151
L. T. 30, 98 J. P. 244, 78 Sol. Jo. 207, really left the question open, although
Maugham, L. J., (as he then was) thought the children fell outside the
ordinary category of licensees and invitees.
26Coates v. Rawtenstall Borough Council, [1937] 3 All E. R. 602, 157
L. T. 415, 101 J. P. 483.
27[1922] 1 A. C. 74, 91 L. J. P. C. 49, 126 L. T. 262.
2
-Aiken v. Kingborough, 62 C. L. R. 179.
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business in his own interest, but in the course of a transaction
with the occupier to which his visit is reasonably incidental." 30
Concerning the position of those who enter a railway station
to farewell travellers, it is true that some cases have treated such
persons as invitees. 31 It must be admitted that here there is no
direct bond of material interest. These cases, however, have been
questioned and the point must still be regarded as an open one.3"
Dixon, J., explains them as resting on the principle that "the
visitor comes on a matter of material interest, if his presence is in
a general way ancillary to the business carried on by the
occupier.1 33 If this principle is broadly interpreted, it would go
far to meet Professor Prosser's point that the element of business
interest becomes so small in many cases that it may really be
ignored. But an examination of English cases reveals few ex-
amples of this, whereas the emphasis on common interest is very
much stressed in the majority of decisions.
B. CASES RELATING TO LICENSEES
Many of these have already been discussed, so far as they bear
upon the question of the definition of an invitee. Thus an invitee
of a tenant is merely a licensee of the landlord ;34 a child in a public
playground is only a licensee. 3  The decision is reached in both
these cases precisely because there is no bond of material interest
between the visitor and the defendant. In English law, if I throw
open my house for a public lecture, to which admission is free, the
visitors are (it is submitted) merely licensees. One using a public
swimming pool gratuitously is only a licensee, if we adopt the
recent decision of the Court of Appeal. lany of the American
cases seem to have gone much further than the English deci-
sions go.
L9Ibid. 209.
:"Lipman v. Clendinnen, (1932) 46 C. L. R. 550, 558-9. The same view
was laid down by the High Court in Leveridge v. Skuthorpe, (1919) 26
C. L. R. 135, 19 N. S. W. L. R. 254, 36 N. S. W. V. N. 46.
3Watkins v. Great Western Ry., 46 L. J. Q. B. 817, 37 L. T. 193.
The Australian courts have followed this decision: Langton v. Board of
Land & Works, (1880) 6 V. L. R. (L.) 316; Lipman v. Clendinnen, (1932)
46 C. L. R. 550.
32Charlesworth, Negligence, 104; cf. also Thatcher v. Great Western
Ry. Co., (1893) 10 T. L. R. 13. The M. R. said that in strictness friends
were not owed the same duty as passengers, but in practice a railway com-
pany must show reasonable care towards both.33Lipman v. Clendinnen, (1932) 46 C. L. R. 550.3
'A recent illustration of this is Morgan v. Girls' Friendly Society,
[1936] 1 All E. R. 404, 80 Sol. Jo. 323.3rEllis v. Fulham Borough Council, supra, note 25.
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Many of the interesting points which Professor Prosser dis-
cusses are not directly covered by English authority, e.g., the
child accompanying an adult who enters a shop to make a pur-
chase; passengers in a car which stops at a garage for petrol. One
case mentioned would be treated in English law as falling under
the head of nuisance rather than that of occupier and visitor. If
an occupier paves a piece of his land near the highway and throws
it open to the public, what is the position of one who walks over
it? He is not an invitee unless there is a bond of material interest
between him and the owner. But the law imposes a duty to main-
tain the property so as not to be a nuisance to users of the high-
way.3
6
36Owens v. Scott & Sons, Ltd., & Wastall, [1939] 3 All E. R. 663,
following Harrold v. Watney, [1898] 2 Q. B. 320, 67 L. J. Q. B. 771, 78
L. T. 788, 46 W V. R. 642, 14 T. L. R. 486.
